Translated by international news agencies and newspapers
Introduction
Seven years after the signing of the revitalizing agreement to resolve the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which took place after a series of negotiations hosted by Khartoum in mid-2018 and ended with the final signing on the Twelfth of September of the same year in Addis Ababa, the nascent state today faces a very complex political scene, where the collapse of the peace process intersects with the entrenchment of individual rule and the deepening of external dependence and dependence.
What was supposed to be a power-sharing agreement and an end to a decade of civil war has gradually turned into a regime that depends for its survival on external sponsors, military protection provided by Uganda, financial support and diplomatic cover coming from the UAE for various reasons.
By late 2025, the spirit of the agreement had completely eroded. The trial of First Vice-President Riek Machar, the widespread crackdown against the mobilization of the White Army of a tribal nature, and the economic collapse caused by the war in Sudan, together led to the birth of a new authoritarian regime based on survival through external security and financial alliances, not through constitutional legitimacy or national consensus.
First: the activated Agreement and its corrosive structure
The transitional government of national unity was reconstituted under the revitalized agreement to include a president and five vice-presidents, and adopts a road map ending with general elections. The agreement also stipulated the integration of all armed armies into a unified national army, the establishment of transitional justice institutions, and the drafting of a permanent constitution under the supervision of the Intergovernmental Authority on development (IGAD), the African Union and the United Nations.
However, the implementation path began to erode early, and in early 2025 reports, the reconstituted Joint Monitoring Committee (RJMEC) described implementation as being in a state of "almost complete paralysis". The forces have not been integrated, the constitutional committees have not, and the mechanisms of transitional justice have remained a dead letter.
The transitional phase was extended twice (in 2022 and 2023), then the elections were postponed again to December 2026, with the new government to start in February 2027, and thus the transitional phase turned into a permanent political situation, and the agreement became a framework for freezing the conflict, not bypassing it.
In terms of form, the agreement remained in place; but its content based on participation and mutual control collapsed, and Riek Machar`s ouster and trial confirmed that power is no longer managed by consensus of partners, but by an increasing monopoly of political and military decision in the hands of the president or his entourage.
Second: Riek Machar turned from an accomplice to an accused
1.The roots of the clash and the events of Nasser
The city of Nasser, located on the banks of the White Nile in the Upper Nile state near the Ethiopian border, is one of the historical strongholds of the armed opposition Movement led by Riek Machar since the nineties of the last century. It embraces a broad social base of Nuer nationalism, and in the southern political imagination it is a symbol of the beginnings of the split from the original popular movement in 1991 in what was known as the"Nasser split".
Since the signing of the revitalized peace agreement in 2018, Nasser has remained a sensitive Center for the balance between government and opposition forces, and a test of the parties ` commitment to a permanent ceasefire. In the first week of March 2025, tension escalated in the region following reports of armed crowds of the "White Army" — local Nuer youth groups — approaching points belonging to the government people`s Army (SSPDF)K.friction turned into open confrontations on March 10, which led to dozens of deaths on both sides, and the seizure of limited positions by militants near Nasser.
Juba responded by accusing SPLM - IO of coordinating with local groups to launch a" new insurgency under tribal cover", while the movement denied this, stressing that the fighters"do not follow it organizationally and that the government is using the incident as an excuse to settle political scores with Machar".
On March 16 and 17, the air force of the South Sudan People`s Army (sspdf), with the logistical participation of the Ugandan army (UPDF), launched intensive raids on the vicinity of Nasser, which, according to local organizations, caused at least twenty deaths, including women and children.
The government later announced the "restoration of full control over the region," but the repercussions of the attack were deeper than the military event itself, as it triggered a political crisis within the transitional government between the two peace partners.
2. From encirclement to political exclusion
Following the Nasser events, the House of First Vice President Riek Machar in Juba was surrounded by security and military units, and a number of his most prominent political and military leaders were arrested, including oil minister but Kang Chol and several officers from the unified army under formation, including the deputy chief of staff of the people`s Army, who reports to Machar`s forces.
The government justified the move as a" precautionary measure to protect national security, " while the opposition considered it a direct violation of the 2018 agreement, which prohibits unilateral measures against its parties.
On March 28, 2025, the Sudan People`s liberation movement – in opposition (SPLM-IO) issued a statement in which it confirmed: "the movement remains committed to the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement in letter and spirit, despite the detention of a number of its leaders in clear violation of the terms of the agreement," and called on IGAD and the African Union to intervene urgently "to prevent the country from sliding towards a comprehensive confrontation".
Weeks later, specifically in April, the movement announced that Machar was effectively placed under house arrest, calling the move a"reproduction of the conditions of 2013 that led to the war".
"It has suspended its participation in some joint executive committees in protest against unilateral measures,"the statement said.
The government responded with a counter-statement asserting that “the house arrest is a temporary preventive measure aimed at facilitating the investigation”, and that Machar “is not being treated as a political detainee but as a witness being interrogated”.
3. The beginning of the trial and the end of the partnership
On the eleventh of September 2025, the Ministry of Justice announced the opening of criminal proceedings against Machar and eight of his aides, and charged them with charges including high treason, murder and crimes against humanity.
"The investigations proved their involvement in planning and coordination with elements of the White Army to destabilize the country,"the government spokeswoman said.
The movement`s response came quickly through a statement published by its offices in Juba and Addis Ababa, in which it described the accusations as "fabricated and serving a political goal of excluding Machar and his party from the political process", and stressed that the trial "represents a fundamental violation of the 2018 Agreement and a blow to the principle of power sharing".
While the government said that the case was "an internal judicial track to punish the instigators of violence", regional and international parties at IGAD and the United Nations considered the measures to have a clear political character, warning that it "may return the country to the climate of ethnic and military polarization that preceded the Civil War".
4. Political connotations
The trial of Riek Machar represented the final blow to the revitalized peace agreement, as it practically abolished the principle of bilateral partnership, which formed the basis of the transitional phase.since his arrest, the boundaries between "political rivalry" and"treason" have disappeared, and the executive branch has turned into an adversary and a referee at the same time.
While the Kiir wing adhered to the rhetoric of "imposing the prestige of the state," the popular movement in the opposition considered that "the prestige of the state is not built on subjugating partners, but on respecting agreements," and so the country slipped into a new situation in which reliance on force and the judiciary instead of consensus, and transitional institutions turned into tools to criminalize the opposition, and not into a space for national participation.
Third: the White Army and the new militarization of the peace path
The “White Army” is a complex phenomenon in the political and social history of South Sudan, it is not a regular army in the institutional sense, but an armed Civil formation consisting mainly of Nuer youth in the rural areas stretching between Upper Nile, Jonglei and unity. It originated in the Eighties of the last century as forces to protect livestock and villages, before gradually turning into a local armed force that participated in successive civil wars, sometimes on the side of the popular movement, and sometimes in confrontation with it, depending on ethnic and political balances.
Since the signing of the 2018 agreement, the government has been dealing with these groups with a degree of cautious tolerance, as their dismantling was considered a prerequisite for the success of the unification of forces stipulated in the revitalized agreement, but with the failure of that process, and with the escalation of local anger at the violations of the government army, the “White Army” began to regain its activity in early 2025, in the form of intermittent confrontations in Upper Nile and Jonglei states.
Field testimonies show that the recent movement of the White Army was not a coordinated rebellion as presented by Juba, but a wave of local anger fueled by the excesses of government army elements in Nuer villages, including the confiscation of livestock and random arrests, but the government saw in it a “conspiracy with a political dimension” linked to Riek Machar`s faction, or perhaps an opportunity to get rid of him.
The incident quickly developed into a large-scale confrontation when groups of the “White Army” moved towards government positions in the vicinity of the city, and the Sudan People`s Liberation Army (sspdf) responded with artillery and aerial bombardment. While SPLM-IO leaders issued statements denying any organizational relationship with the White Army, the government used the incident to launch a large-scale military campaign under the pretext of "fighting terrorism" and calling for a Ugandan military intervention.
Fourth: the role of Uganda-from a guarantor of the agreement to a partner in repression
1.Entry into the Ugandan army and legal controversy
In early March 2025, Uganda officially announced the deployment of special units of its people`s Army (UPDF) in the capital Juba "to secure vital institutions and prevent the infiltration of armed groups," but multiple reports confirmed that the deployment was made at the direct request of the government of Salva Kiir and the leadership of the Sudan People`s Liberation Army (sspdf), recalling the experience of 2013 and 2016 when Uganda intervened militarily to save the regime from collapse.
The decision sparked a political and legal controversy inside Kampala, as members of parliament criticized the absence of any official authorization allowing the army to operate outside the borders, warning against repeated abuse of its powers by the executive authority, and despite official justifications that the deployment came at the request of a “brotherly country and a member of IGAD,” it quickly became clear that the Ugandan troops were directly involved in combat operations, after participating in air and artillery strikes alongside the people`s Army in the vicinity of Nasser, which contradicts Juba`s description of the intervention as "technical and logistical support.
This intervention coincided with a remarkable shift in the political discourse, as the talk in Juba moved from "implementing peace" to "imposing security", in what has become locally described as "peace security", that is, turning the peace agreement into a cover to expand military control, not to install political consensus.
2. Mohozi Kainerugaba`s tweets and regional controversy
The statements of the commander of the Ugandan army, general muhuzi kainirugaba, the son of President Yoweri Museveni, deepened the crisis of confidence surrounding the Ugandan role, between March 18 and 23, 2025, muhuzi posted a series of tweets on the platform “X” (Twitter) in one of which he said: "I am tired of killing Nuers. These are our brothers, but they need one leader to obey. On Dr. Riek Machar should submit to his uncle in advance," and in another tweet, he called Salva Kiir an“uncle”, stressing that "any threat against him is a declaration of war on Uganda".
These statements provoked a wave of regional condemnation in Juba, Addis Ababa and Nairobi, which the opposition in South Sudan promised an explicit declaration of the bias of the Ugandan army, and proof that its intervention was not to protect civilians but to tip the ruling regime`s hand.
As for civil society organizations, they saw in the phrase "tired of killing Nuers" a speech of a serious ethnic nature that threatens civil peace and undermines any possibility of national reconciliation, the Ugandan foreign ministry did not issue an explicit denial, saying only that "the general expressed his personal opinion," which was interpreted as implicit collusion with the political content of the statements.
3. Security and territorial motives
The Ugandan role is based on an old strategic perception of South Sudan as a buffer zone for Uganda`s national security.any unrest in the North is immediately reflected on the Ugandan borders through the influx of refugees, the growth of smuggling and weapons, or the possible return of the remnants of the LRA. therefore, Kampala adopts the principle of "pre-containment", that is, addressing the danger outside the borders before it infiltrates.
But this security concern has turned in recent years into a pretext to extend regional influence, especially after the decline of the Ethiopian role and the withdrawal of Sudan, while IGAD was satisfied with the calls for dialogue, Uganda presented itself as the practical guarantor of regional security, gaining double negotiating influence at the expense of Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Khartoum, occupied with existential threats.
4. Personal Alliance and system survival accounts
Also, the relationship between Yoweri Museveni and Salva Kiir is based on a historical mutual alliance since the liberation war against Khartoum.Kampala provides Salva with military and political support, while Kiir provides Uganda with a Northern Economic and security outlet that limits any possible Sudanese expansion. with the escalating dispute between Kiir and Machar since the beginning of this year, Museveni considered that the fall of the regime in Juba would lose its most important regional allies, so the military intervention came as a preventive measure to ensure the survival of the strategic ally, not in compliance with the terms of the peace agreement.
5. Economics as a motive for war and peace
South Sudan is the largest market for Ugandan goods, importing more than half a billion dollars a year in food, construction materials and manufactured products, and the nimle–Juba road is a vital artery for Ugandan land trade towards the Horn of Africa, so any unrest in the South becomes a direct threat to Kampala`s commercial interests and its main source of hard currency, which partly explains Uganda`s keenness to keep the situation in Juba under control, even through force.
6. The personal dimension and the rise of"military diplomacy"
Through populist rhetoric and sharp statements, he tried to paint an image of Uganda as a “friendly power that does not hesitate to use weapons to protect peace", and in return, this behavior practically revealed what can be called the"rust of Ugandan diplomacy".
7. Overlapping interests with the UAE
The Ugandan deployment coincided with the expansion of the UAE`s influence in Juba.parallel security and economic understandings were concluded between Kampala and Abu Dhabi, centered on protecting the regime and facilitating energy and infrastructure investments. thus, the Ugandan role became part of an undisclosed tripartite axis that includes Uganda, the UAE and South Sudan, which is in essence an alliance for the regional redistribution of spheres of influence after the decline of the Sudanese and Ethiopian roles.
8. The legitimacy of the regime and Museveni`s internal gains
The military operation provided ready-made propaganda material to President Museveni, who emphasized that his army is “the most disciplined and professional in Africa,” using external intervention as evidence of the efficiency of state institutions in Uganda and the continuity of leadership. At the same time, the war helped to distract attention from the crises of corruption and inflation, revived the nationalist rhetoric linking regional security and the“historical leadership” of the president. The intervention in South Sudan has thus become a tool to strengthen legitimacy at home, and the peace agreement itself has become a means of stabilizing the two regimes in Juba and Kampala together with the help of Abu Dhabi.
Fifth: the UAE`s economic role-from oil credit to influence engineering
1.An economy stuck with a broken pipe
Since secession, the economy of South Sudan has remained based on oil, which makes up more than ninety percent of state revenues.
South Sudan exports crude through the pipeline that passes from Unity State North to the port of Bashir on the Sea coast in the city of Port Sudan, which made the Southern economy affected by what is happening to its northern neighbor both politically and economically.
Since the outbreak of the war in Sudan in April 2023, this artery was gradually affected until its closure in early 2024 due to the significant damage it suffered in the White Nile and Sennar regions, according to oil ministry data and UN reports, however, the stoppage, revenues collapsed, and the government in South Sudan faced an inability to meet salaries and a scarcity of foreign currency, to enter a phase of almost complete dependence on aid and loans.
2. Oil credit deal with the UAE
In the midst of this crisis, in mid – 2024, a financing agreement was announced between South Sudan and the United Arab Emirates worth an estimated 13 billion dollars, it was said that it extends for ten years and is financed by guaranteeing future oil exports.the agreement – attributed to a private Emirati company (Hamad Bin Khalifa Department of Projects) - included promises to finance the Juba oil refinery and the expansion of Wau airport, along with soft loans and humanitarian aid, but after the first hype, it turned out that the deal had not entered into full force.
No actual payments were announced, no details of payment or allocated quantities of oil were presented, and they were not included in the state budget, in other words, the agreement turned into a political framework rather than an enforceable financial commitment, although it remained large enough to make the UAE one of the most prominent potential creditors of Juba.
3. The shipping crisis and the reorientation of oil
In mid-2025, the economic relationship between Juba and Abu Dhabi was affected by the escalating crisis between Sudan and the UAE, after Khartoum classified Abu Dhabi as an "aggressor country" after the escalation that accompanied the bombing of vital sites in the interim administrative capital in Port Sudan, including an attempt to target the residence of the chairman of the Sudanese sovereign Council, and a while later the UAE ports stopped receiving and exporting shipments related to Port Sudan, which indirectly included Southern crude transported through Sudanese territory to UAE ports.
Juba suddenly found itself without a safe outlet to market its oil, and was forced to divert shipments to Asian markets through new arrangements with companies in Malaysia and Singapore, and thus the UAE deal became suspended between politics and the economy, it is not officially canceled, nor is it valid in practice, at a time when the South lost one of its most important logistical and commercial outlets.
4. Field presence: hospital in Aweil
The Emirati role in South Sudan was not limited to funding, in March 2025, the Emirates Red Crescent Authority opened a field hospital in the city of Aweil, north of Bahr el Ghazal, near the border of South Sudan with the states of West Kordofan and East Darfur, where the rapid support militias are deployed, the project was officially presented as a humanitarian initiative, but its location raised many questions،
It intersects with the border hotline, which is witnessing war-related logistical activity in Sudan.
Some local voices considered that the site was chosen for reasons that go beyond the humanitarian aspect, as observers repeated the model of the amgres hospital in eastern Chad, which was used as a treatment and evacuation point for quick support militia fighters, and a cover for logistical and military supply operations and the recruitment of mercenaries to fight the Sudanese army, while Juba contented itself with confirming that the hospital serves border communities and provides vital medical services even to Sudanese refugees, and in both cases, the UAE presence in Aweil became a symbol of overlapping aid and geopolitical considerations at the same time.
5. Diplomacy of visits and new allegiances
Over the past two years, mutual visits between Juba and Abu Dhabi have intensified.Minister of state for African Affairs Shakhbut bin Nahyan Al Nahyan visited the capital Juba several times, while President Salva Kiir made a number of official visits to the UAE in search of financial and investment support, which amounted to three visits during the current year.
What was remarkable was the emergence of the new vice-president Paul Mel, who turned into a favorite face of the Emiratis after the ouster of Riak Machar.
Paul mill participated in economic forums in Abu Dhabi and signed memorandums of understanding on energy and agriculture projects, in what seemed to be an Emirati attempt to install a political and economic partner more in line with its vision for the region.
Sixth: conclusion
Since the signing of the revitalizing peace agreement in South Sudan in 2018 — drafted in Khartoum and signed in Addis Ababa under the auspices of IGAD — the country seemed to be moving towards a fragile stability based more on top-level compromises between leaders than on building effective democratic institutions. Over time, it turned out that the agreement did not produce peace so much as established a system of sharing power and resources, the balances of which are managed through a network of regional alliances rather than regulated by transparent national mechanisms.
This agreement, in essence, belongs to the model of “liberal peace”, which is usually formulated under external supervision and is based on temporary deals between the conflicting elites, according to which they are given positions in power in exchange for compliance with the ceasefire. This model often replaces domestic legitimacy with external trusteeship, producing dependency instead of sovereignty, and fails to create real mechanisms of accountability and reconciliation. Therefore, the revitalized agreement did not make a breakthrough in the structure of the war, but rather reproduced the system itself in new forms, after the state institutions lost their financial and military independence, and the implementation of its provisions became subject to the will of the guarantors and financiers. While Uganda continued to consolidate its military influence by supporting the people`s Army in Juba, the UAE`s role in financing the regime and maintaining its nominal stability gradually expanded, until Abu Dhabi became one of its unspoken pillars.
With the outbreak of war in Sudan in 2023 and the decline of its regional role, the influence of IGAD diminished and a regional vacuum emerged that was quickly filled by Abu Dhabi, Khartoum`s influence in its natural surroundings declined, and South Sudan gradually turned into a logistical fulcrum in the network of influence stretching from Abu Dhabi to East Africa. This transformation represents a direct threat to Sudan`s national security, as the areas of military and logistical activity are approaching its western and northern borders, and the environment of the South is being reshaped as a rear platform for any project hostile to the unity and stability of Sudan.
The moment of latency that Sudan is experiencing cannot be prolonged; silence in front of this transformation means recognizing a deeper decline in the influence of the state and its ability to protect its vital sphere. The existing model in the south, although it seems to be a temporary victory for the ruling regime, carries with it a long — term threat, because the questions of State-Building, identity and institutions remain unanswered-the same questions faced by all Horn of Africa countries, from Mogadishu to Addis Ababa and Juba, where the fragility of institutions intersects with the absence of a comprehensive national project for development and security.