Abdelkader Mohamed Ali - researcher and political analyst specializing in African Affairs
Since Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopian colonialism in 1993, Ethiopian-Eritrean relations have gone through cycles of ups and downs, and have always been characterized by a remarkable acceleration in the transition between the two sides of this relationship. The years 1991-1998 reached an unprecedented stage of cooperation and integration, only to suddenly break out the three-round border war of 1998-2000.
This was followed by a state of peace and non-war that ended with the arrival of Dr. Abiy Ahmed to power in his country in 2018, where a peace agreement was signed between the two countries that paved the way for strategic cooperation that culminated in the Tigray war (2020-2022), and soon followed by a sharp deterioration that has continued until now, as a new war looms between the two sworn neighbors.
In order to understand the peak reached by the Ethiopian-Eritrean tension in recent months, a map of intertwined motives that seem difficult to separate from each other emerges before the researcher, but in our estimation they are centered on two files from which other differences breed, namely the Pretoria Agreement and the Ethiopian claim to a sovereign port on the Red Sea, which is included in the declaration of entitlement to the Eritrean port of Assab and the threat to occupy it. In this paper, we will work to clarify the main drivers of disagreement between the parties, starting with the Pretoria agreement, which is the oldest.
Controversy over the Pretoria agreement
The Pretoria agreement between both the Tigray People`s Liberation Front and the Ethiopian federal government represented a promising step towards establishing peace and stability in Ethiopia, painstakingly reached after two years of bloody battles that have been described as one of the most violent conflicts of the XXI century.
However, this agreement, which ensured a calm on the ground and on the political front between the two signatories, led to the outbreak of tension of another kind between the government of Dr. Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, because it contained a number of problematic items that did not satisfy Asmara.
Despite Asmara`s denial that it sought to undermine the Pretoria agreement, some observers have described the Eritrean leadership`s feeling about it as a "stab in the back", as it was excluded from participating in the talks leading to this agreement despite its army`s active involvement in operations alongside the Ethiopian federal forces and their allies, suffering heavy losses, and the country falling under various sanctions as a result of this participation.
The most prominent problematic items related to dealing with the Tigray People`s Liberation Front, which the Eritrean regime considered an existential threat to it for years, as the agreement gave the kiss of life to the front, which suffered a severe military defeat. The talks led to an agreement to cancel the terrorist status of the front, which means preserving its political entity as a legitimate Ethiopian party, in addition to agreeing on the formation of an interim regional administration in Tigray, in which the front has a central role.
If we expand the angle of view, it can be said that the Eritrean negative attitude towards Pretoria was not related to the future of the Tigray People`s Liberation Front alone, but rather that the Eritrean leadership saw in the way the negotiations were conducted – under direct American auspices – a gateway to strengthen relations between Washington and Addis Ababa and perhaps to target Eritrea later, as US-Eritrean relations have suffered a state of almost constant tension for more than two decades, and Afwerki is the most prominent African critic of the policies of successive US administrations on the continent and the world.
The Eritrean rejection of any agreement with Tigray was not alone behind the Ethiopian leadership`s conduct of negotiations alone, but was accompanied by various economic and political pressures from Washington and the African Union – the main sponsors of the Pretoria agreement – where Addis Ababa was threatened with various papers, including the possibility of withdrawing the headquarters of the African Union from it. Thus, Washington`s efforts succeeded in dismantling the alliance between the two countries, a strategic goal it had pursued throughout the months of the war.
Ethiopia`s ambitions for access to the Red Sea
Over the past two years, there has been a constant demand from the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, for his country to obtain a sovereign Sea port, as this demand represents one of the most important drivers of the current crisis between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It can be divided into two main stages:
The first stage began with Ahmed`s affirmation, in a speech delivered in October 2023, of his country`s need for a sovereign Sea port, and he listed many arguments that support this claim, including historical and practical factors related to the economic, demographic and security vulnerabilities resulting from the geographical reality of Ethiopia as a country with a population of about one hundred and twenty million.
Since then, there have been voices of Ethiopian currents that believe that Ethiopia`s loss of the coast as a result of Eritrea`s independence was a historical mistake that must be corrected; this is echoed in the statement issued by the Ethiopian Prime Minister, who said that Addis Ababa lost its access to the sea as a result of a "historical and legal mistake" after a civil war and foreign conspiracies, and that the Ethiopian government has been working for years to "correct" this mistake.
This speech rang alarm bells in Asmara due to a number of factors, including what is related to the history of the relationship between the two countries; Ethiopia fully annexed Eritrea in 1952, as access to the sea was its most important goal than controlling Eritrea, which eventually led to the outbreak of the Eritrean revolution, which was able through a thirty-year struggle to take the freedom of the country.
The second worrying factor for Asmara is that although Ahmed downplayed the importance of using force to obtain the port in his famous speech to parliament in November 2023, he warned that this issue could lead to conflict if peaceful ways fail, an agenda that has been repeated by pro-government media since then.
The third striking factor is that all Ethiopian statements referred to the desire to obtain an outlet on the Red Sea, even after the signing of the memorandum of understanding with the secessionist Somaliland region, the Ethiopian discourse remained focused on the Red Sea, which is a worrying indicator in Asmara, which feels that the port of Assab is the target of this discourse.
The second stage: the port of Assab in southern Eritrea became the focus of tension between the two countries, with the escalation of Ethiopian threats issued by military and civilian officials of their country`s right to own the port, and this was supported by a set of controversial and legally flimsy arguments, arguing that the Ethiopian government that waived it was not authorized to do so because it did not have the necessary popular authorization to take such a step.
This was accompanied by Ethiopian threats to reconsider withdrawing its recognition of Eritrea`s secession under the same legal justification, as the government of Abiy Ahmed announced under the dome of Parliament the possibility of withdrawing recognition if Eritrea does not dialogue with it on the issue of the sea port.
At this stage, a continuous data war has emerged between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in which the latter has departed from its usual policy of silence and ambiguity, which indicates the sensitivity and seriousness that Asmara feels towards these Ethiopian statements.
The proxy war between the parties
The deterioration of relations between the two countries led to Eritrea and Ethiopia pursuing the usual policy of agency warfare in the Horn of Africa, each side supported the forces opposing the other, and the map of alliances can be drawn as follows:
1-Eritrea supports Ethiopian forces:
The signing of the Pretoria agreement not only led to the disintegration of the Eritrean-Ethiopian alliance, but also dealt a fatal blow to the alliance between Abiy Ahmed and the Amharic nationalist militias that were one of the main partners in the war on the Tigray People`s Liberation Front. These militias consider that they were excluded from participating in the negotiations and were not consulted on the terms of the cessation of hostilities agreement before its adoption.
Eritrea`s relationship with these militias began early, as it received training by the Eritrean army during the Tigray war in the framework of confronting the Tigray People`s Liberation Front, but with the disintegration of its alliance with Abiy Ahmed, the latter, in turn, emerged as a new adversary for both these militias and for Asmara, as Ethiopia pointed fingers at Eritrea for supporting the armed Amharic militias, which are fighting a fierce war in the Amhara region with federal forces after the government`s decision to dissolve it in April 2023, which.
On the other hand, disagreements within the leadership of the Tigray People`s Liberation Front led to a coup against the interim administration of the territory and the seizure of power by the wing led by Debrecen Gebre Mikael, many sources indicate a rapprochement between him and Asmara against the background of the position of Abiy Ahmed, whom the front accuses of not fulfilling the implementation of the Pretoria agreement.
In this context, an alliance called "tasmadu" or "synergy" in Tigrinya has recently emerged as a popular initiative between the two sides of the border in the Ethiopian Tigray region and the Eritrean territory. Despite its popular character, many observers considered it a cover for an alliance between the Debrecen wing and Asmara, which Ethiopia confirmed in a letter sent by its foreign ministry to the UN secretary-general in October 2025, accusing this alliance of igniting war inside Ethiopia, undermining the Pretoria Agreement and supporting the Amhara rebels.
The Tigray People`s Liberation Front has denied these accusations, stressing that the Ethiopian government has not implemented the terms of the Pretoria Agreement, and that the "samadu" initiative is only a "positive and constructive step towards peace-building and regional reconciliation".
In addition to these two parties, Eritrea has relations with other Ethiopian armed forces, including the Oromo Liberation Army, and the Afri faction led by Ibrahim Osman.
2-Ethiopia supports Eritrean opposition forces:
For its part, Addis Ababa supports a number of Eritrean opposition groups. On January 27, 2025, the Ethiopian capital hosted a conference of the controversial "burqid ni Hamdo – brigade of the Earth" group, which began its activities by targeting celebrations held by the Eritrean government in the Eritrean diaspora in Western countries.
This conference was an important step in the work of this group, as it was attended by a large number of members and supporters, with the participation of the Eritrean Afridi National Congress. The conference concluded with the adoption of the military option to overthrow the Eritrean regime, which is clearly important considering that the motive behind this conference, for its organizers, is the need to bring the struggle against the Eritrean regime closer to the country`s borders.
The Ethiopian government also turned to supporting opposition afar organizations, most notably the "afar Red Sea Democratic Organization (RDADO)", as it allowed them to take the Afar region of Ethiopia as the headquarters of their political and social activities. The organization has held major conferences and public meetings in Samra, the capital of the region, and has also opened offices in Ethiopia. Reports indicate that it received logistical support from the Abiy Ahmed government, which provided its fighters with a safe haven to carry out their operations inside Eritrea.
The tripartite alliance
The Somali-Ethiopian tension against the backdrop of Addis Ababa signing a memorandum of understanding with the secessionist Somaliland region has produced a new map of alliances in the region, as the position of Ethiopia formed the ground for the formation of a tripartite alliance that included Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia in October 2024, through which the leaders of the three countries pledged to strengthen security cooperation and improve regional stability.
This alliance was referred to as "part of a framework developed by Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia to confront Ethiopia if it goes ahead with the ports agreement with Somaliland". This was enough to raise the concerns of Addis Ababa, which felt that it was aimed at limiting its influence as a major player in the Horn of Africa, especially since it coincided with the signing of a military agreement between Egypt and Somalia and the arrival of Egyptian troops and equipment in Somalia. Thus, Eritrea`s involvement in this alliance was an additional factor that increased tension between Addis Ababa and Asmara.
Crisis export strategy
The internal factor seems to be present in this crisis on both sides of the border, where the escalation with Eritrea represents a tool for the Ethiopian prime minister to divert attention from the internal crises that the country is going through at the economic, security and societal levels.
Ethiopia is under the brunt of the economic consequences of the war on Tigray, while unrest continues in many of the country`s major states, mainly Amhara and Oromia, which negatively affects the economy. This is accompanied by the continuation of the escalating ethnic rhetoric, which has witnessed a sharp explosion since 2018, and the Pretoria agreement is teetering on the brink of failure, which may lead to an explosion of the situation in Tigray again.
On the other hand, the ongoing tension with Ethiopia and the potential for conflict with it constitute a way out for the Eritrean regime to postpone dealing with the expected national entitlements. The opening of the said argument brought the country into a state of emergency that has been extended for more than two decades, including the failure to hold presidential and legislative elections or activate the draft constitution approved in 1997.
After the end of the Tigray war and the significant scaling-down of the role of the Popular Front for the liberation of Tigray (PFLP-GC), hopes for internal reforms have increased, including opening the public sphere, halting the extended conscription program, and loosening the regime`s grip on the economic sector, all of which have receded under the pressure of recent tensions with Addis Ababa.
Abstract
After this review, it can be said that the Ethiopian-Eritrean crisis is deep and multidimensional, which increases its seriousness and the seriousness of the escalation path it is taking. It also adds further obstacles to any attempt to propose a solution that defuses them and prevents a large-scale military clash that will have disastrous consequences, not only for the two countries alone, but for the entire Horn of Africa region.
To get out of this vicious circle of tension, there is a need for the leaders of the two countries, together with the regional and international parties concerned with stabilizing the south of the Red Sea, to draw the contours of a new strategy capable of assuring Eritrea`s fears for its sovereignty, meeting Ethiopia`s ambitions to access the sea, and alleviating its economic burdens according to various partnership models that exist in the world today.